

Checking the Paths to Identify Mutant Application on Embedded Systems

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
SecTech 2010



Outline

- I. Work context
- II. Mutant application
- III. Path check detection
- IV. Evaluation process
- V. Conclusion

Java Card workflow



Mutant

- Definition

- A piece of code that passed the BC verification during the loading phase or any certification or any static analysis, and has been loaded into the EEPROM area,
- This code is modified by a fault attack,
- It becomes hostile : illegal cast to parse the memory, access to other pieces of code, unwanted call to the Java Card API (getKey).

Attack models

Fault model	Timing	precision	location	fault type	Difficulty
Precise bit error	total control	bit	total control	set (1) or reset (0)	++
Precise byte error	total control	byte	total control	set (0x00), reset (0xFF) or random	+
Unkonwn byte error	loose control	byte	no control	set (0x00) or reset (0xFF) or random	-
Unkonwn error	no control	variable	no control	set (0x00), reset (0xFF) or random	--


Non-encrypted memory ↑

↓ Encrypted memory

Example of mutant

Bytecode	Octets	Java code
00 : aload_0	00 : 18	<code>private void debit(APDU apdu) {</code>
01 : getfield #4	01 : 83 00 04	
04 : invokevirtual #61	04 : 8B 00 3D	
07 : ifeq 59	07 : 60 00 3B	<code> if (pin.isValidated()) {</code>
10 : ...	10 : ...	<code> // make the debit operation</code>
...	...	<code> } else {</code>
57 : goto 66	57 : 70 00 3B	<code> ISOException.throwIt (</code>
59 : sipush 25345	59 : 13 63 01	<code> SW_PIN_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED);</code>
63 : invokestatic #13	63 : 8D 00 0D	<code> }</code>
66 : return	66 : 7A	


Stack




Example of mutant

Bytecode	Octets	Java code
00 : <code>aload_0</code>	00 : 18	<code>private void debit(APDU apdu) {</code>
01 : <code>getfield #4</code>	01 : 83 00 04	
04 : <code>invokevirtual #61</code>	04 : 8B 00 3D	
07 : <code>nop</code>	07 : 00	<code>if (!pin.isValidated()) {</code>
08 : <code>nop</code>	08 : 00	
09 : <code>pop</code>	09 : 3B	
10 : <code>...</code>	10 : ...	<code>//make the debit operation</code>
...	...	
57 : <code>goto 66</code>	57 : 70 00 39	<code>} else {</code>
59 : <code>sipush 25345</code>	59 : 13 63 01	<code>ISOException.throwIt (</code>
63 : <code>invokestatic #13</code>	63 : 8D 00 0D	<code>SW_PIN_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED);</code>
66 : <code>return</code>	66 : 7A	<code>}</code>
		<code>}</code>

Stack



Used approach



```
@SensitiveType{
  sensitivity= SensitiveValue.INTEGRITY,
  proprietaryValue="FoB"
}
```

```
private void debit(APDU apdu) {

  if ( pin.isValidated() ) {
    // make the debit operation
  } else {
    ISOException.throwIt (
      SW_PIN_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED);
  }
}
```

```
X
XRR
XRR
XRR
...
...
XRR
XRR
X
```




Path Check (PCh) : principle

- Goal:
 - Detect control flow deviation
- Principle
 - Off-card :
 - Compute all the path from a control flow graph
 - On-card :
 - Compute runtime path and compare with previously computed paths


Path Check (PCh) : example

```
0 aload_0
1 getfield #4
4 invokevirtual #18
7 ifeq 98 (+91)
10 aload_1
11 invokevirtual #11
14 astore_2
15 aload_2
16 iconst_4
17 baload
18 istore_3
19 aload_1
20 invokevirtual #19
23 i2b
24 istore 4
26 iload_3
27 iconst_1
28 if_icmpne 37 (+9)
31 iload 4
33 iconst_1
34 if_icmpeq 43 (+9)
37 sipush 26368
40 invokestatic #13
43 aload_2
44 iconst_5
45 baload
46 istore 5
48 iload 5
50 bipush 127
52 if_icmpgt 60 (+8)
55 iload 5
57 ifge 66 (+9)
60 sipush 27267
63 invokestatic #13
66 aload_0
67 getfield #20
70 iload 5
72 isub
73 i2s
74 ifge 83 (+9)
77 sipush 27269
80 invokestatic #13
83 aload_0
84 aload_0
85 getfield #20
88 iload 5
90 isub
91 i2s
92 putfield #20
95 goto 104 (+9)
98 sipush 25345
101 invokestatic #13
104 return
```

Path Check (PCh) : example



Path Check (PCh) : example



Path leading to node 9 computed off-card:

0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---


Path leading to node 9 computed on-card

0	1	1	1
---	---	---	---

Path Check (PCh) : conclusion

- Advantage
 - Allow to detect modifications that influence control flow graph and thus to fight against bypassing crucial tests.
- Drawback
 - Can't detect a modification that doesn't influence control flow graph .

Evaluation



Evaluation tools

- Abstract Interpreter
 - Simulate VM behavior during applet interpretation
 - Simulate fault attacks
 - Implement some BCV checks, and the developed countermeasure(s)
- Mutant generator
 - Application vulnerability analysis tool that allows the generation of a sensitivity report
- Evaluation board
 - AT91 EB40A arm7 with SimpleRTJ virtual machine

Efficiency: mutants reduction

* Path Check
 ** Field of bit
 *** Basic block

Reference model	Partial BCV	PCh*	FoB**	BB***
440	81%	87%	93%	100%
-	1,51	3	2,42	2,82
5 s	5 s	2 s	4 s	1 s

Wallet non encrypted memory - 472 attacks on 236 instructions

Efficiency: mutants reduction

Reference model	Partial BCV	PCh	FoB	BB
3743	54%	56%	73%	100%
-	1,01	13,06	8,61	10,53
810 s	605 s	218 s	121 s	95 s

Wallet encrypted memory - 60892 attacks on 236 instructions

Benchmark: maximum resources consumption

	CPU overhead	EEPROM	ROM
Field of bit	$< 5\%$	$\approx 3\%$	$\approx 1\%$
Basic block	$< 5\%$	$\leq 5\%$	$\approx 1\%$
Path check	$< 8\%$	$\leq 10\%$	$\approx 1\%$

Metrics obtained with all methods tagged

Conclusions

- The exposed countermeasure
 - Respectful of the Java Card specification
 - Brings security interoperability
- It is affordable for the card
 - Memory consumption
 - CPU overhead
- Less work for developers
 - Only need to use an annotation
- Lightweight change of the VM interpreter

Thank you for your attention
Any questions ?

Ressources at:
<http://msi.unilim.fr/~sere/>