

A friendly framework for hiding fault enabled virus for Java based smart cards

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DBSec'12



- 1 Introduction
 - Smart Card
 - Objectives
 - Context
 - CAP File Manipulation
- 2 Fault enabled viruses
 - Example: get the secret key
 - Constraints solving
 - Address resolution
 - Hide your code
 - Code mutation
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 - Code mutation
- 3 Conclusion

Smart Card



Smart card is...

- Tamper-Resistant Computer
- Securely stores and processes information
- Used in:
 - SIM card
 - Credit Card
 - Health Insurance Card, etc.

It contains critical information!

Objectives

- Understand the implemented Java Card security mechanisms
- Improve these implementations
- Design the associated counter-measures

Context

Smart card attacks:

- Physical:
 - voltage modification (execution flow)
 - light injections to the memory cells (LED, laser, etc.)
 - electromagnetic attack
- Logical:
 - CAP file manipulation (bypass off-card BCV)
 - shareable interface mechanism (no longer possible)
 - transaction mechanism
- Combined attack:
 - fault injection (bypass on-card BCV)


Context

Two categories of logical attacks:

- Ill-typed application: modification of input file **(1)**
- Well-typed application:
 - specification weakness
 - application mutation **(1)**

(1) Byte code transformation engineering at CAP file level

Converted APplet (CAP) File



The CAP File Manipulator

CAP MAP

- Java-based framework
- Allows to read any element of a CAP file
- Modification of any component of a CAP file
- Friendly tool to design logical attacks



CAP MAP

Cap File Manipulator

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
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Fault enabled viruses

Our mission

Build a program that may have two semantics execution



Example : get the secret key

```
public void process(APDU apdu) {  
    short localS; byte localB;  
    // get the APDU buffer  
    byte [] apduBuffer = apdu.getBuffer();  
    if (selectingApplet()) { return; }  
    byte receivedByte = (byte) apdu.  
        setIncomingAndReceive();  
  
    // any code can be placed here  
    //...  
    DES_keys.getKey(apduBuffer, (short)0);  
    apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,16);  
}
```

B1

B2

B3

Constraints solving

Domain definition

$$\mathbb{I} = \{\mathbb{I}_0, \dots, \mathbb{I}_n\}$$

$$\mathbb{I}_0 = \{\{ins_1, ins_2, \dots\} / operands = 0\}$$

$$\mathbb{I}_n = \{\{ins_1, ins_2, \dots\} / operands = n\}$$

\mathbb{S} : *Stack*

Constraints solving

Constraints:

Find $\mathbb{X}_1 = \{ins_1, ins_2, \dots\}$ such as:

- $\mathbb{X}_1 \in \mathbb{I}_n$
- $|\mathbb{S}_1| > |\mathbb{S}_0|$
- $|\mathbb{S}_i| \leq MaxStack$
- number of locals must not change
- $\forall ins_i \in \mathbb{X}_1, \mathbb{S}_0(ins_i) = \mathbb{S}_1(ins_i)$

Address resolution

```
// any code can be placed here  
// ...  
DES_keys.getKey(apduBuffer, (short)0);
```

Listing 1: Original B2 to hide

Address resolution

OFFSETS	INSTRUCTIONS	OPERANDS	
...			
/*00d4*/	nop		
/*00d5*/	nop		
/*00d6*/	getfield_a_this	1 // DES_keys	
/*00d8*/	aload	4 // L4⇒apdubuffer	
/*00da*/	sconst_0		
/*00db*/	invokeinterface	nargs: 3, index: 0, const: 3, method: 4	B2
/*00e0*/	pop	// return byte	

Address resolution

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/*00d8*/	aload	4 // L4⇒apdubuffer	
/*00da*/	sconst_0		
/*00db*/	invokeinterface	nargs: 3, index: 2, const: 60, method: 4	B2
/*00e0*/	pop	// return byte	

Address resolution

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/*00d5*/	nop		
/*00d6*/	getfield_a_this	1 // DES_keys	
/*00d8*/	aload	4 // L4⇒apdubuffer	
/*00da*/	sconst_0		
/*00db*/	invokeinterface	03, 02, 3C, 04	B2
/*00e0*/	pop	// return byte	

Hide your code

Hide your code

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/*00d8*/	ifle	??	
/*00d9*/	invokeinterface	03, 02, 3C, 04	B2
/*00de*/	pop	// return byte	

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/* 00d8*/	ifle	8E	
/* 00da*/	sconst_0		B2
/* 00db*/	sconst_m1		
/* 00dc*/	pop2		
/* 00de*/	sconst_1		
/* 00df*/	pop	// return byte	

Code mutation

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Conclusion

- Contributions: basic constraints solver, stack evaluator
- CAP MAP is a friendly framework that gives us the ability to:
 - make CAP file manipulation in a coherent way
 - design logical attacks
 - design fault enabled viruses
- SmartCM, a static analyzer to detect fault enabled viruses
- Our future works includes: second order viruses

